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Abstract 
Given the tremendous energy challenges Morocco faces, and its potential role as an exporter of green electricity to Eu-
rope, the country has been particularly targeted by Germany’s efforts to promote the uptake of renewable energies 
abroad. This paper explores whether ideas and policies in the field of renewable energy effectively traveled through 
transfer channels established between Germany and Morocco. In particular, the question of how Morocco’s policy ob-
jectives shaped the result of transfer processes is discussed, shedding light on a currently under-researched determi-
nant for policy transfer. Drawing upon forty-five semi-structured interviews with Moroccan, German, and international 
stakeholders, as well as card-ranking exercises, the article provides first-hand insights into the dynamics and drivers of 
Morocco’s “energy transition”. Findings presented in the article show that differing policy objectives did not preclude the 
transfer of ideas between Germany and Morocco, but shaped its outcome with regard to policy instrument selection. 
While basic policy orientations in favour of renewable energies were facilitated by transferred knowledge, a perceived in-
compatibility between domestic policy objectives and the policy instruments used in the foreign model led to selective les-
son-drawing from the German example. This finding underlines the importance for “senders” who wish to actively pro-
mote sustainable energy policies abroad to adapt outreach strategies to the policy objectives of potential followers. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding what drives and shapes the diffusion 
and transfer of sustainable energy policies is highly rel-
evant at a time when numerous countries in the world 
find themselves at energy policy crossroads and look for 
inspiration abroad. Among potential determinants for 
the transfer of principles, policies, or instruments be-
tween “sending” and “receiving” countries, this article 
takes a closer look at the role of policy objectives. For 
both senders and receivers (or “leaders” and “follow-
ers”, as they are more commonly referred to in the liter-
ature), understanding the impact of similar or differing 
policy objectives on the prospects of policy transfer is 
essential. For followers interested in drawing lessons, a 
critical evaluation of the fit between domestic policy ob-
jectives and foreign models is necessary to avoid trans-
fer-related policy failure (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 
Pegels, 2014, p. 184). Pioneers can use these insights to 
promote learning from their policies more effectively by 
taking into account the goals followers primarily pursue. 
Following the widely used definition by Dolowitz 
and Marsh (2000, p. 5), transfer is understood in this 
paper as a process “by which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
one political setting (past or present) is used in the de-
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velopment of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political setting". Con-
sequently, the aim in this paper is not to test whether 
Morocco “copied” the German Energiewende, but to 
enquire how policy objectives shaped the use of evi-
dence from this example and of information provided 
by German transfer agents in the Moroccan debate 
and in policy decisions for renewable energy in the 
electricity sector. Focusing on policy objectives as a po-
tential determinant for transfer is particularly relevant 
here: while many factors known to facilitate policy 
transfer (communication channels, structural incen-
tives, the presence of German transfer agents) come 
together in the case of Morocco and Germany, priori-
ties pursued through an increase of renewables in the 
electricity mix differ, as discussed below.  
The German energy transition—or Energiewende—is 
one of the most prominent examples of an energy tran-
sition (Rat für nachhaltige Entwicklung, 2013; Weidner & 
Mez, 2008), making it a likely potential source of inspira-
tion for countries considering changes to their own en-
ergy system. Although recent studies reveal considera-
ble interest in the German energy transition or 
“Energiewende” from observers abroad (GIZ, 2012a; 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2013, 2014), little is known 
about the extent to which lessons are effectively drawn 
from this example and how active policy promotion by 
Germany impacts decision-making in other countries.  
Assessing transfer from the German energy transi-
tion is rendered challenging given the multitude of pol-
icies, programs and instruments in place to achieve its 
targets for renewable energy (80% of the electricity 
mix by 2050), C02-reduction (80−95% by 2050), the re-
duction of primary energy consumption (50% by 2050), 
and nuclear phase-out (to be completed by 2022). The 
German Energiewende is a “transition from below”, 
started in the late 1970s (Maubach, 2013, p. 42), a time 
when the term “Energiewende” started to be used in 
the pro-renewables and anti-nuclear community 
(Krause, Bossel, & Müller-Reissmann, 1980). The Ger-
man government’s decision to re-accelerate nuclear 
phase-out following the Fukushima disaster in 2011 
and the definition of long-term goals up to 2050 in the 
2010 Energy Concept and the 2011 Energiewende leg-
islative package (BMWi, 2011; BMU, 2011) increased 
global attention for Germany’s Energiewende. Rather 
than marking a radical change of path, these decisions 
build up on policies in place at least since the early 
2000s (Renewable Energy Act adopted in 2000, build-
ing up on the Electricity Feed-in Act from 1990; nuclear 
phase-out decided in 2002), leading to a steady in-
crease of the share of renewables in the German elec-
tricity mix to up to 27.3% in 2014 (Graichen, Kleiner, 
Litz, & Podewils, 2015). The core policy instrument 
used to promote the uptake of renewables in Germany 
are technology-specific feed-in tariffs, although a re-
cent reform of the German Renewable Energy Act fore-
sees test runs for auctions of ground-mounted photovol-
taic capacity from 2015 onwards (Bundestag, 2014). To-
day, 47% of installed renewables capacity in Germany is 
citizen-owned (Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien, 2014).  
While its quantitative targets are clearly defined, 
the hierarchy of political objectives1 the Energiewende 
is to achieve remains subject to discussion (Joas, Pahle, 
& Flachsland, 2014). One important objective and ra-
tionale for Germany’s energy transition since its begin-
nings has been to gain followers on the way towards 
more renewables (Bundestag, 1988). Despite recent 
criticism concerning their economic efficiency, German 
feed-in tariffs and the resulting uptake of renewables 
contributed to a spectacular decrease in prices for re-
newable energy technologies worldwide, in particular 
for photovoltaics, making them more accessible to po-
tential followers. The aim to promote renewables in 
partner countries also led to the establishment by 
Germany of various programs to encourage the uptake 
of renewables in other countries (Steinbacher & Pahle, 
2015). Morocco has been particularly targeted by these 
efforts (GIZ, 2012b), which makes it a relevant case to 
analyze the transfer of knowledge and ideas from the 
German energy transition and, in general, through 
transfer channels established with Germany.  
Morocco’s potential role as a multiplier for sustain-
able energy in developing countries, but also its market 
potential as the “most promising destination for solar 
and wind energy in the MENA region” (Vidican et al., 
2013, p. 2), and the prospect of importing “green” 
electricity from Morocco in the future, led Germany to 
invest considerable resources in technical and financial 
assistance in the field of renewable energy (KfW, 
2014). Numerous programs, including policy advice, 
capacity-building measures, pilot projects and a bilat-
eral energy partnership, have been established since 
the 1980s between Germany and Morocco, creating 
multiple channels of communication through which 
policy transfer can take place.  
Although Morocco is not a major CO2 emitter on a 
global scale, a better understanding of its approach to 
renewable energy policy is of relevance: with its ambi-
tious plans for renewable energy in the power sector, 
Morocco can aspire to a leadership role in Northern Af-
rica and can serve as a source of inspiration and les-
sons for other African countries (Amrane, 2013). Its 
approach to energy transition governance can thus po-
tentially provide lessons for other emerging and devel-
oping countries willing to avoid lock-ins in high-carbon 
energy systems in the future.  
                                                          
1 At this occasion, it should be noted that “targets” such as 
the share of renewable energy were not considered “objec-
tives” for the purpose of this paper. The aim was to explore 
what objectives should, in fine, be achieved via a higher share 
of renewables rather than considering such an increase as an 
objective in and of itself.  
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Given these favorable basic conditions for transfer, 
the aim in this paper is to explore to what extent prin-
ciples, policies or instruments in the field of renewable 
energy travelled through the channels of communica-
tion established between Germany and Morocco, given 
that the priorities the two countries pursue through 
the deployment of renewable energy differ in central 
respects. To carry out this analysis, the article follows a 
three-step approach: it sheds light on the policy objec-
tives Morocco pursues with its “energy transition” 
(Section 4), provides examples of how lessons from the 
German energy transition and knowledge provided by 
German transfer agents were used in policy-making for 
renewable energy in Morocco (Section 5), and discusses 
what conditions made (selective) transfer possible be-
tween Germany and Morocco (Section 6). Prior to this, 
expectations from the policy transfer literature (Section 
2) are summarized and methods presented (Section 3).  
Analysis in this article is based on findings from for-
ty-five semi-structured interviews, ranking exercises, as 
well as document analysis carried out in the framework 
of field research in Morocco in the first quarter of 
2014. Results suggest that strong established transfer 
channels, Morocco’s own claim to leadership, and 
Germany’s reputation as a leader led experts and deci-
sion-makers to use evidence provided by German 
transfer agents despite differing objectives.  However, 
while the diffusion of basic policy orientations (“more 
renewables”) was effectively facilitated by German 
transfer agents, this was not the case for policy instru-
ments, where negative lessons drawn from the Ger-
man experience contributed to the choice of multi-
criteria tenders to promote renewables.  
From a theoretical point of view, the case of re-
newable energy policy transfer to Morocco shows that 
differences in objectives do not preclude lesson-
drawing, but lead to selective transfer, hybridization 
(Evans, 2009, p. 246) or policy osmosis (Genovese, 
Kern, & Martin, 2012). From the perspective of “lead-
ership by diffusion” (Biedenkopf, 2012; Steinbacher & 
Pahle, 2015), the transfer of knowledge on energy 
transitions requires followers’ (potentially differing) 
political objectives to be taken into consideration. This 
finding adds to the discussion on the role of issue-
linking and promoting co-benefits to facilitate the 
adoption of climate-friendly policies by countries with 
priorities other than climate protection (Cosbey, 2009). 
2. Policy Objectives as Potential Determinants for 
Transfer 
2.1. Diffusion and Transfer of Sustainable Energy 
Policies 
The growing literature on policy transfer and diffusion2 
                                                          
2 For an account of the terminology debate see for example 
has provided crucial insights into if and how models 
and policies spread across time and space. The spread 
of diverse environmental policy instruments (Holzinger, 
Knill, Heichel, & Sommerer, 2010; Sommerer, 2011), 
energy policies (Matisoff & Edwards, 2014; Stouten-
borough & Beverlin, 2008; Vasseur, 2014), including 
feed-in tariffs (Busch, 2003; REN21 Secretariat, 2012) 
and renewable energy portfolio standards (Chandler, 
2009; Matisoff, 2008; Smithwood, 2011), is a strong in-
dicator for interdependent policy-making in the field of 
environment and energy. Hypotheses have been for-
mulated on why follower countries turn to foreign 
models in search for inspiration and lessons (e.g., 
Heinze, 2011), on what actors are involved in transfer-
ring policies (Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2004) 
and on how transfer is linked to policy success and fail-
ure (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). From a geographical 
point of view, transfer and diffusion research has how-
ever been criticized for largely focusing on diffusion 
within or between OECD countries (Evans, 2004).  
The potential “objects” of policy transfer under 
scrutiny in this paper are the rules and institutions 
governing the generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources. Although this does not cover the entire 
scope of the German energy transition as a potential 
source of lessons, the focus can be justified taking into 
account the prominence of this sector both in the im-
plementation of the Energiewende in Germany and in 
Moroccan-German cooperation over many years.  
2.2. Compatibility and Similarity of “Senders” and 
“Receivers” as Determinants for Transfer 
The compatibility or fit between a pioneering policy 
model and the regulatory tradition of potential follow-
er countries has been identified as one of the main de-
terminants for policy transfer (Busch & Jörgens, 2005, 
p. 5; Heinze, 2011; Rose, 1991; Tews, 2002). The expec-
tation is that the more a policy instrument, tool or idea 
is in line with existing institutions and administrative 
practices—and with domestic policy objectives—the 
more likely it will be adopted by a follower country. 
Beyond the requirement of regulatory fit, cultural and 
economic similarity between follower and leader coun-
try is also considered to influence which foreign mod-
els policy-makers and advisors take into account when 
formulating policies. By using “analytical shortcuts” in 
processes of bounded rational learning (Meseguer, 
2005, p. 2), only a limited number of foreign models (if 
any) are usually considered in the search for policy so-
lutions. Besides the perceived success of the model 
and availability of information on a foreign model, the 
common belonging of follower and leader country to a 
                                                                                           
Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill (2007). The term policy transfer is 
employed in this paper since a specific, bilateral case of po-
tential lesson-drawing is under scrutiny here. 
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“cultural reference group” (Simmons & Elkins, 2004, p. 
175) makes it more likely for a follower to consider a 
specific foreign policy model. Looking at policies im-
plemented in countries with similar cultural, religious, 
political, linguistic, or economic characteristics is ex-
pected to provide “highly relevant information on the 
appropriateness of a particular policy” (Simmons & 
Elkins, 2004, p. 176), increasing the likelihood for trans-
fer. With Morocco and Germany differing in many re-
spects, this argument is put to a test in the analysis of 
policy transfer between them.   
2.3. Instrument Selection, Transfer and Policy 
Objectives 
Literature on policy transfer and diffusion regards the 
perceived “success” and “reputation” (Jänicke, 2005) of 
the pioneering model as important cognitive heuristics. 
These heuristics do however depend on policy objec-
tives pursued and therefore on the indicators for suc-
cess a follower country applies. Different elements of a 
foreign policy design can be perceived as successful, 
compatible and appropriate depending on what objec-
tives the follower aims to achieve. An assessment of an 
energy policy’s track record will therefore vary accord-
ing to whether climate goals or low electricity prices, 
job creation or citizen participation or other objectives 
are prioritized. It therefore appears necessary to focus 
on the role of objectives for transfer outcomes and in-
strument selection in follower countries. 
Choosing policy instruments is an inherently politi-
cal process and reflects understandings and beliefs: 
“granted its [the government’s] favorable attitude to 
doing something about it, which solution it wants to 
see in effect obviously depends on its beliefs how dif-
ferent measures will affect national interests and val-
ues” (Malnes, 1995, pp. 102-103). The policy field of 
renewable energy is no exception to the rule and the 
political economy of energy transition policies is receiv-
ing growing attention (Baker, Newell, & Phillips, 2014; 
Mitchell, 2008). A range of instruments to promote re-
newable energies is available to policymakers, with dif-
ferent outcomes and effects on “national interests” to 
expect. Whereas feed-in tariffs provide security to 
smaller investors and can easily be designed to en-
courage decentralized energy generation, auctions are 
generally organized to bring about the most cost-
efficient solution and are sometimes too complex and 
risky for households and small enterprises (see for ex-
ample Jacobs et al., 2014; Kreycik, Couture, & Karlynn, 
2011, p. 32). They can, however, be designed to pro-
mote other objectives beyond low prices, such as local 
economic development, as the case of South Africa 
shows (Eberhard, Kolker, & Leigland, 2014). The choice 
of policy instruments—impacted or not by external im-
pulses and knowledge about foreign models—thus ap-
pears as closely linked to the objectives an energy tran-
sition should achieve in the eyes of decision-makers. 
3. Methods 
Findings and analysis in this paper rely on forty-five 
semi-structured interviews, forty of which included a 
ranking exercise, as well as on the analysis of docu-
ments including minutes of meetings, project reports, 
press releases and policy documents. Interviews were 
carried out in Rabat and Casablanca in February and 
March 20143 with interview partners selected to cover 
organizations involved in energy-related projects of 
German-Moroccan cooperation (see Table 1). These 
projects were funded by different German depart-
ments (Ministry for Environment, Ministry for Econom-
ic Affairs, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment) and are implemented by GIZ, the German 
agency for international cooperation (Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) and/or KfW, 
the German development bank (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau). Representatives of all main Moroccan 
institutions involved in the formulation and implemen-
tation of energy policies were covered, such as the Mo-
roccan Ministry for Energy, Mining, Water and the En-
vironment (Ministère de l’énergie, des mines, de l’eau 
et de l’environnement, MEMEE) and Morocco’s verti-
cally integrated, state-owned electricity and water utili-
ty ONEE (Office national de l’électricité et de l’eau). 
Within these organizations, the focus was put on high-
ranking officials who had been in direct contact with 
German advisors, which does introduce a certain bias 
to the sample of interviewees. For an external view on 
Moroccan-German energy relations, representatives of 
international institutions (e.g., World Bank, African De-
velopment Bank) and third countries (Spain, France) 
were interviewed. Interviews lasted 65 minutes on av-
erage and were carried out in French or German, with 
quotes in this paper being translated by the author. In-
terviewees were guaranteed anonymity. 
Table 1. Overview of institutions and organizations 
covered through interviews. 
ADEME French Environment and Energy 
Management Agency 
ADEREE Moroccan Agency for the 
Development of Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency 
AFD French Development Agency 
AfDB African Development Bank 
AHK German Chamber of Commerce in 
Morocco 
Amisole Moroccan solar industry association  
Cegelec French electrical engineering 
company 
                                                          
3 Two interviews were carried out over the phone in Moroc-
co, one interview was conducted in Germany. 
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CFCIM French Chamber of Commerce in 
Morocco 
CNRST Moroccan National Centre for 
Scientific and Technical Research 
Consultants Energy policy consultants, Morocco 
EIB European Investment Bank 
German 
Embassy 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in Rabat 
GIZ German Development / 
International Cooperation Agency 
IDE-E Institute for Development, 
Environment and Energy in 
Morocco 
IRESEN Moroccan Institute for Research on 
Solar and New Technologies 
KfW German Bank for Reconstruction  
Maroc Sans 
Nucléaire 
Moroccan citizens’ organization 
against nuclear energy 
MASEN Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy 
MEMEE Moroccan Ministry for Energy, 
Mining, Water and the 
Environment 
Moroccan 
Embassy 
Embassy of the Kingdom of 
Morocco in Berlin 
Saharawind Sahara Wind Project: Energy for 
Sustainable Development 
SIE Moroccan Society for Energy 
Investments 
Siemens Siemens Morocco & Tunisia 
Spanish 
Embassy 
Economy and Trade section, 
Spanish Embassy in Morocco 
World Bank World Bank Morocco, Rabat office 
3.1. Ranking Exercise: Energy Transition Objectives 
To assess stakeholders’ view on the objectives of Mo-
rocco’s renewable energy policy, a ranking exercise 
modeled on the approach used by Joas, Pahle and 
Flachsland (2014) was carried out. Similar, yet often 
more complex forms of “card sorting” or “q-methods” 
have mainly been used in information architecture re-
search, psychology and the social sciences (Müller & 
Kals, 2004). Interview partners were asked to rank thir-
teen small paper cards in whatever form they judged 
most appropriate to answer the question “What are 
the objectives Morocco pursues through its new re-
newable energy strategy?”. Interviewees were asked 
not to express what should be the objectives pursued, 
but what they thought to be the actual goals pursued 
through the planned increase of solar, hydro and wind 
capacity in Morocco. The objectives proposed were the 
following (original in French): energy independence, 
job creation, creating an industry, electricity exports, 
societal or identitary project, environmental and cli-
mate protection, decentralization, liberalization, avoid-
ing nuclear energy, international community’s expecta-
tion, leadership, attracting investors, and affordable 
electricity prices. Interviewees were free to discard 
cards and ask for objectives to be added. The selection 
of objectives for the Moroccan case draws upon official 
statements such as a speech held by Morocco’s Minis-
ter for Energy, Abdelkader Amara, on the objectives of 
Morocco’s energy transition in Casablanca in Novem-
ber 2013 (Ministère de l'Energie, Mines de l'Eau et de 
l'Environnement, 2013a)4. Information gathered through 
interviews and the ranking exercise, was completed 
with official statements of Moroccan officials at major 
sectorial events5 and in document analysis.  
3.2. Analysis and Caveats 
Interviewees were free to rank several objectives at 
the same level of importance, which could have war-
ranted a recalculation of ranks (for individual ranking 
results, see Table A1 in the Annex). For example, when 
three cards were ranked as top priorities, each of them 
could have been attributed (1+2+3)/3 = 2 points as an 
average rank. The subsequent card, ranked as a 2nd-
level priority by the respondent, would then have re-
ceived rank 4. The choice has been made in this paper 
not to use average ranks but to consider multiple cards 
ranked as top priorities as equally important as a single 
card ranked first in a strictly hierarchically ranking. In-
terviews were fully transcribed and coded around the 
13 objectives proposed, in a qualitative content analy-
sis approach (Gläser & Laudel, 2010). Since the number 
of interviews and ranking exercises carried out is high 
in relation to the size of the Moroccan energy land-
scape, but too low for solid statistical inference, figures 
provided in the following sections need to be considered 
within the context of the interviews and taking into ac-
count the variety of forms—strictly hierarchically or 
not—in which cards were ranked by interview partners.  
4. Goals and Practice of the Moroccan “Energy 
Transition” 
4.1. Morocco’s Energy Challenges 
Morocco’s energy system faces numerous challenges, 
putting it in a “very precarious energy and financial sit-
uation” (Vidican et al., 2013, p. 9) and pushing it to 
look for ways to increase capacity in recent years. First 
of all, given the country’s minimal domestic fossil fuel 
                                                          
4 “Refusal of nuclear power” was added as an objective to 
explore similarities with the German approach to energy 
transition governance. 
5 CGEM Conference on energy transition, 27 November 2013, 
Casablanca; Solemn plenary session of the Académie Hassan 
II des Sciences et Techniques, 19 and 20 February 2014, Ra-
bat; Solaire Expo, 26 February 2014, Casablanca; 8th German-
African energy forum, G, 14 and 15 April 2014, Hamburg. 
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resources, Morocco is heavily dependent on imports; 
secondly, Morocco’s economic and demographic 
growth caused a steep increase in total energy de-
mand; thirdly, demand is also rising on a per capita ba-
sis as standards of living rise. As a consequence, prima-
ry energy supply rose by almost 60% between 2002 
and 2012. According to a recent comprehensive as-
sessment of the Moroccan energy sector by the Inter-
national Energy Agency, oil provides two thirds of Mo-
rocco’s primary energy consumption in 2012, followed 
by coal (16%), biofuels (7.4%), natural gas (5.7%), net 
electricity imports (2.2%), hydro (0.7%) and wind 
(0.3%) (IEA, 2014, p. 11). While per capita energy con-
sumption nearly doubled between 2002 and 2011, im-
port dependence remained relatively stable at ex-
tremely high levels comprised between 93.0% (2010) 
and 97.5% (2008). The financial burden of net energy 
imports was multiplied by more than four during that 
time (Direction de l’Observation et de la Programma-
tion, n.d.). Although total electricity generation in Mo-
rocco increased by almost 80% from 2002 to 2012, av-
erage electricity consumption is still eleven times lower 
than the IEA average. However, Morocco’s strong reli-
ance on fossil fuels leads to a C02-intensity per unit of 
GDP higher than the average of member countries of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014). Morocco’s 
internationally praised rural electrification program 
(Programme d’électrification rurale globale, PERG) in-
creased the share of electrified households from 18% 
in 1995 to over 98% today.  
4.2. A New Energy Strategy 
Morocco’s ambitious renewable energy targets are at 
the core of its “new national energy strategy” (Minis-
tère de l'Energie, Mines de l'Eau et de l'Environnement, 
2013b) defined in 2009. The strategy also foresees an 
increase of conventional capacity, but introduces sig-
nificant solar and wind capacity for the first time. Mo-
rocco’s renewable energy and energy efficiency targets 
are ambitious, with the share of renewable energy in 
total primary energy consumption set to increase from 
5% in 2009 to 20% in 2030. Forty-two percent of in-
stalled electricity capacity should be renewable by 
2020 (Ministère de l'Energie, Mines de l'Eau et de l'En-
vironnement, 2013b, p. 33) and 15% energy savings are 
aimed for by 2030 (Ministère de l'Energie, Mines de 
l'Eau et de l'Environnement, 2013b, p. 26) compared to 
a business-as-usual scenario. Among renewables, only 
hydro (1700 MW, with only about 10% contribution to 
electricity generation due to a lack of precipitation in 
recent years) and wind (750 MW, of which 300MW 
came online in early 2015) have significant capacity in-
stalled today, with total electricity generation capacity 
amounting to about 7800MW, including recent addi-
tions of the Tarfaya wind park and additional units at 
the Jorf Lasfar coal plant. Despite the recent adoption 
in 2014 of a roadmap for solar photovoltaics, announc-
ing the effective opening of the mid- and low-voltage 
levels to generators, a regulatory framework for this 
type of small-scale installations is still missing.  
The two main legal texts for the implementation of 
Morocco’s renewable energy strategy are law 13-09 on 
renewable energies, granting the possibility to private 
investors to develop renewable energy projects, and 
law 47-09 on energy efficiency. Even more central to 
the Moroccan energy strategy are the two national 
plans King Mohammed VI launched in 2009 and 2010 
respectively, the Moroccan Solar Plan and the Moroc-
can Integrated Program for Wind Energy  with a tar-
geted total capacity of 2000MW solar and 2000MW 
wind by 2020 (MASEN, 2010; ONE, 2010). A 2000MW 
goal for hydro-electricity was fixed as well, but is al-
most reached already through existing installations and 
plants under construction (Ministère de l'Energie, 
Mines de l'Eau et de l'Environnement, 2013b).  
To implement the Moroccan solar plan, power pur-
chasing agreements (PPAs) are awarded through ten-
ders at predefined sites (PWMSP Project Consortium, 
2013, p. 15). In the first phase of the Moroccan solar 
plan, tenders for what is to become the world’s largest 
concentrated solar power (CSP) complex at Ouarzazate 
were launched in two phases in 2012 and 2015. The 
first plant, Noor 1, is expected to become fully opera-
tional in 2015. The integrated wind plan relies on build-
own-operate-transfer contracts (ONE, 2014), with 
850MW of wind capacity still to be awarded. 
4.3. Is Morocco Pursuing an Energy Transition? 
Despite these ambitious objectives for renewables, the 
question of whether Morocco is pursuing an energy 
“transition” was raised by several interview partners. 
German and other international officials in Morocco 
were generally skeptical about speaking of a “transi-
tion” in the Moroccan case and tended to see devel-
opments primarily as an “enlargement of the electricity 
mix” while, in Germany, “you can speak of a ‘real’ tran-
sition”6. One German official underlined the concept of 
an energy transition had only been used in the past 
year or so by Moroccan officials and suggested it was a 
“trendy” concept, similar to other “concepts that are 
en vogue like sustainable development, green econo-
my, circular economy and the like”7. Some Moroccan 
officials shared this view, noting that “in Morocco, one 
has to speak of an energy-development rather than an 
energy transition. I do not see this as a ‘Wende’ [sic], a 
U-turn, but as a new strategic orientation with a focus 
on renewable energy and clean technologies (…)”8. For 
                                                          
6 International interview partner, private sector, 21/02/2014, 
Casablanca. 
7 German interivew partner, GIZ, 27/02/2014, Rabat. 
8 Moroccan interivew partner, IRESEN, 04/03/2014, Rabat. 
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several interview partners, given the change of path 
outlined in Morocco’s current national energy strategy, 
from a system almost entirely based on the import of 
fossil fuels towards considerable shares of renewable 
electricity capacity, the use of the concept of energy 
transition to the Moroccan case appeared justified, 
underlining that in Morocco, “the energy transition is 
not a choice, it’s a necessity”9. This is in line with public 
statements by high-ranking officials including Minister 
Amara: “We made the energy transition a clear, strate-
gic political choice dictated by the clear-sighted and 
determined vision of His Majesty the King Mohamed VI 
(…)” (Ministère de l'Energie, Mines de l'Eau et de l'Envi-
ronnement, 2013a, p. 2).  
4.4. Stakeholders’ Views on the Political Objectives of 
Morocco’s Renewable Energy Strategy 
Clear trends regarding priority objectives of the Mo-
roccan energy transition towards more renewables 
could be identified throughout the interviews and 
rankings. The objective seen as the top priority was (in-
creasing) “energy independence” with an average rank 
of 1.9, putting it above “job creation”, which comes sec-
ond with an average rank of 3.1. “Avoiding nuclear pow-
er” (8.0) and “decentralization” (7.4) were considered to 
be the goals the Moroccan government is pursuing the 
least intensely with its renewable energy strategy10.  
4.4.1. Increasing Energy Independence—The N°1 Focus 
of Morocco’s Energy Transition 
According to those interviewed, reducing dependence 
from energy imports is the top priority the Moroccan 
government is pursuing with its renewable energy poli-
cy. German and international interview partners in Mo-
rocco saw this objective as being even more important 
(both 1.6), on average, than Moroccan interview part-
ners (2.1). The goal of energy independence is not en-
tirely self-explanatory: electricity imports from Spain 
tend to be cheaper than electricity produced within 
Morocco (Agueniou, 2013). Nevertheless, economic 
motives were mentioned (“we could save a lot of mon-
ey if we become independent. I’d call it a ‘key success 
factor’”11). Political drivers for energy independence 
did however prevail in the interviews, with increased 
independence most often described as a strategic goal12 
and renewables being a way to use “national resources” 
rather than foreign ones. Although there was agreement 
among interview partners on the importance of this goal 
as a driver for renewable energy deployment, several 
                                                          
9 Moroccan interivew partner, MEMEE, 11/03/2014, Rabat. 
10 Cards excluded by interviewees were not considered in the 
calculation of this average rank. 
11 Moroccan interview partner, SIE, 06/03/2014, Rabat. 
12 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
recognised that Morocco is unlikely to achieve full inde-
pendence from imports: “[…] it’s an objective, but one 
that will never be reached, it’s impossible”13. 
4.4.2. The Socio-Economic Cluster: Job Creation and 
Industrial Policy  
Many interviewees chose to thematically cluster objec-
tives they saw as being linked. This was most often the 
case for socio-economic goals, the second most im-
portant group of objectives of Moroccan energy policy, 
in the eyes of respondents. Job creation (average rank 
3.1), affordable electricity prices (4.0), the develop-
ment of renewable energy industries (4.1) and attract-
ing investors (4.3) were commonly described by inter-
viewees as causing each other: “creating jobs is a 
consequence of attracting investors”14. The linkages 
between renewable energy projects and socio-
economic benefits were commonly referred to as an 
“integrated approach” by interview partners and in 
strategic documents, showing Morocco’s ambition to 
achieve a higher degree of energy independence and so-
cio-economic objectives simultaneously (ONEE, 2014). 
Among socio-economic objectives, job creation was 
perceived as the most important goal pursued by the 
Moroccan government through its energy strategy. 
German officials ranked it even higher (2.2) than Mo-
roccan (3.2) and international officials (4.1). At the 
same time, German and third country respondents fre-
quently expressed doubts about the appropriateness 
of current policy measures to reach this goal, despite 
the inclusion of local content thresholds in the tender 
requirements for renewable energy projects. Moroc-
co’s focus on few large-scale renewable energy pro-
jects, considered less likely to create a high number of 
jobs, rather than a decentralized approach led several 
interview partners to put into question the alignment 
between policy objectives and instruments: “(…) it’s 
always the same thing, also with the objective of creat-
ing jobs: there is ambition but the necessary means are 
not put in place“15. The sincerity of the goal of job crea-
tion itself was also questioned, concluding that “those 
job creation arguments are only façade”16. Some sug-
gested the goal of creating jobs was in any case only to 
be achieved indirectly, by providing reliable electricity 
at long-term competitive prices to the industry17. 
4.4.3. Decentralization and Societal Project 
Decentralizing electricity generation was either refused 
                                                          
13 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
14 Moroccan interview partner, SIE, 06/03/2014, Rabat. 
15 International interview partner, private sector, 21/02/2014, 
Casablanca. 
16 German interview partner, GIZ, 12/02/2014, Rabat. 
17 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 08/03/2014, Skype. 
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as a goal by interviewees or understood by several Mo-
roccan interview partners as the distribution of a small 
number of large plants over the whole territory. As one 
interviewee put it “(…) rooftop PV is not a good thing, 
the stability of grids is our highest good. (…) Just com-
pare it with growing crop: people do not grow their 
own crop on their rooftops either! Society always 
transforms things into centrally processed mass prod-
ucts, it’s just more efficient”18. Only a small number of 
interview partners saw decentralization or democrati-
zation as one of the objectives currently pursued. One 
of the officials directly involved in the on-going process 
of opening electricity production to households and 
small enterprises argued “we are about to do a ‘de-
mocratization’ of photovoltaics. All categories of con-
sumers must be able to contribute to the national en-
ergy [transition] process”19.  
Despite the low perceived importance of decentrali-
zation, the Moroccan energy transition was nevertheless 
considered a “societal or identitary project” by a consid-
erable number of Moroccan officials. One interview 
partner, who ranked decentralization as the least im-
portant goal, underlined in the same conversation that 
the “energy transition [is] a societal project, carried by 
the Moroccan society and done by the Moroccan socie-
ty”20, hinting to a different understanding of societal 
participation in an energy transition as would be the 
case for the German Energiewende. This might partly be 
explained by the fact that a “societal or identitary pro-
ject” also included an important element of territorial in-
tegrity in the eyes of several Moroccan officials. The dis-
tribution of large-scale plants across Morocco (which is, 
as stated above, understood by some as “decentraliza-
tion”) includes the “Southern provinces”, the disputed 
territory of the Western Sahara. As Minister Amara put 
it in a public speech “this [renewable energy] program 
encompasses also the national grid in our Southern 
provinces in the framework of a long-term vision of elec-
tricity interconnection with the Sub-Saharan countries 
via Mauritania and Senegal” (Ministère de l'Energie, 
Mines de l'Eau et de l'Environnement, 2013a, p. 7). 
4.4.4. Climate Protection 
Climate protection as a perceived goal of Morocco’s 
energy transition received a medium average rank 
(4.9), but respondents generally described it as an au-
tomatic consequence of the energy policy Morocco 
was putting in place rather than a driver for the de-
ployment of renewables. Major differences between 
Morocco and Germany were pointed out on this issue: 
“Germany develops renewables because of its [cli-
mate] obligations on the European side. For Morocco, 
                                                          
18Moroccan interview partner, academia, 07/02/2014, Rabat. 
19Moroccan interview partner, civil society, 19/02/2014, Rabat.  
20 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 24/02/2014, Rabat. 
climate protection is rather a consequence than an ob-
jective”21. Although public statements position Morocco 
as an “actor of the European energy transition” in sup-
port of Europe’s climate protection goals (Ministère de 
l'Energie, Mines de l'Eau et de l'Environnement, 2013a, 
p. 8), interviewees on the ground were somewhat more 
reluctant to see a true commitment towards climate 
protection, beyond the country’s readiness to export 
green electricity to Europe22. Climate protection was al-
so commonly linked to the objective of responding to 
the “expectations of the international community”. One 
German official called environmental and climate issues 
“sales arguments”23, whereas one international actor 
critically noted that “climate protection and ‘expecta-
tions of the international community’ go together. De-
veloping countries are always asked to do something 
against climate change the others caused”24. In sum, alt-
hough interview partners implicitly or explicitly saw the 
need for global action against climate change, Morocco’s 
renewable energy programs were by most not consid-
ered as being driven by this objective.  
4.4.5. Avoiding Nuclear Energy 
One of the most clear-cut differences between Moroc-
can and German energy transition objectives is the role 
nuclear energy and, to a lesser extent, fossil fuels play 
therein. Whereas for Germany, a full phase-out of nu-
clear power by 2022 has been decided and confirmed 
(BMWi, 2011), not a single Moroccan interview partner 
could exclude the nuclear option for Morocco in the 
middle or long run, although many of them expressed 
their hope that Morocco would be able to refrain from 
using nuclear power. With an average rank of 8.0, 
“avoiding nuclear energy” is the goal interviewees did 
perceive as being the least pursued by current Moroc-
can energy policy. About half of Moroccan interview 
partners (48%) completely excluded it as a potential 
objective of Morocco’s energy strategy, more than for 
any other card. In its 2009 climate action plan, Morocco 
still foresaw the installation of 2 × 1000 MW of nuclear 
power between 2020 and 2030 (Département de 
l’Environnement, 2009, p. 14), but no nuclear plans are 
officially pursued at the moment. Several interview 
partners suggested the French government aimed at 
promoting nuclear energy in Morocco and a bilateral 
agreement to cooperate on this issue was unanimously 
adopted by the Moroccan parliament in 2014 (MAP, 
                                                          
21 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 08/03/2014, Skype. 
22 Spain’s refusal to sign a declaration of intent regarding the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan in 2012 currently precludes elec-
tricity exports from Morocco and the development of renew-
able energy projects for export purposes, at least in the me-
dium term.  
23 German interview partner, GIZ, 25/02/2014, Rabat 
24 International interview partner, private sector, 07/03/2014, 
Casablanca. 
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2014). As one interview partner summarized it, the pre-
dominant view among stakeholders on this issue was 
that “Moroccan civil society is probably firmly opposing 
nuclear power (…) But, in reality, can we afford to refuse 
anything?”25.  
4.5. Differences in Policy Objectives between Germany 
and Morocco 
Morocco’s and Germany’s energy transitions share 
common features, such as an aim to reduce dependence 
on imports of fossil fuel. However, three of the core real-
ities or aims of the German renewable energy policies—
decentralization, climate protection and establishing an 
alternative to nuclear energy—do not appear as goals of 
the Moroccan energy transition. Whereas the role of 
climate protection as a driving force for renewables in 
Morocco is ambiguous, establishing an alternative to 
(potential future) nuclear power and decentralizing elec-
tricity generation were considered the least important 
goals of Moroccan renewable energy policy according 
to those interviewed. In summary, an analysis of rank-
ings, interviews and Morocco’s policy framework 
shows that the Moroccan energy transition is one 
where decisions are taken “always top-down”26, and 
which is oriented towards the major objectives of miti-
gating energy import dependence (resulting in open-
ness towards all sources of energy, including uncon-
ventional oil and gas, and nuclear), as well as job 
creation and industrial policy. 
Although independence and socio-economic objec-
tives do certainly also play a role for the German Ener-
giewende, differences in priorities between the Ger-
man and the Moroccan energy transition strategies 
exist. While these differences are far from being unex-
pected given the countries’ differing economic, politi-
cal and geographic situation, the transferability of les-
sons from the German Energiewende in the presence 
of differing priorities requires close scrutiny. 
5. Renewable Energy Policy Transfer between 
Germany and Morocco 
The full range of transfers of ideas related to coopera-
tion between Germany and Morocco and to active pol-
icy promotion by Germany cannot be reported within 
the limits of this paper. Three important areas will be 
used to illustrate how ideas travelled either from the 
German Energiewende example or through transfer 
channels with Germany: the place of renewables in the 
Moroccan energy strategy and the choice of CSP (5.3), 
the issue of decentralized electricity generation (5.4), 
and the refusal of feed-in tariffs (5.5). Prior to this, 
transfer channels will be reviewed (5.1) and the desira-
                                                          
25 Moroccan interview partner, consultant 08/03/2014, Skype. 
26 Moroccan interview partner, consultant 08/03/2014, Skype. 
bility of transfer from Germany in the eyes of Moroc-
can stakeholders will be discussed (5.2). 
5.1. A Fertile Ground for Transfer 
Cooperation between Morocco and Germany in the 
field of renewable energy has been effective since the 
1980s. A “special energy program” (Osianowski, 1997) 
paved the way for the introduction of first renewable 
energy demonstration projects in Morocco and sup-
ported the country in its efforts to increase the electri-
fication rate from 18% in 1995 to nearly 100% today. In 
the following years, the identification of renewable en-
ergy and especially wind potential within the special 
energy and the TERNA (Technical Expertise for Renew-
able Energy Application) program (Altmann, 2012; GTZ, 
2009), prepared the ground for further policy devel-
opments. The crucial role of these early projects in 
preparing the ground for future renewable energy de-
velopments and in granting German advisors an excep-
tional role was confirmed by Moroccan and German in-
terview partners involved in bilateral cooperation with 
Morocco since the time of the special energy pro-
gram27. To increase the visibility of German support in 
this field, the decision was taken upon the demand of 
Germany to replace “environment” with “(renewable) 
energy” as one of three as one of three official focus 
areas of bilateral cooperation from 2014 onwards28. 
As the first of the MENA (Middle East and North Af-
rica) countries, Morocco entered into a bilateral energy 
partnership with Germany, in July 2012 (BMWi, 2012). 
With more than €850 Mio. of loans and grants, Germa-
ny also provided the biggest share of financing for the 
first two phases of the Ouarzazate concentrated solar 
power (CSP) project (KfW, 2014). In June 2013, Moroc-
co’s commitment to developing sustainable sources of 
energy and its strong ties to Germany earned it a 
membership in the now inactive “Club of Ener-
giewende Countries” (Club der Energiewendestaaten) 
or Renewables Club (BMU, 2013).  
The strong presence of German transfer agents and 
their proximity to Moroccan decision-makers was seen 
as being directly linked to Germany’s own energy tran-
sition experience: “(…) Germany is really focusing its ef-
forts in the energy sector in Morocco. They are very 
strong when it comes to renewable energy and effi-
ciency, it’s therefore a law of nature that they are the 
most active here”29. In particular, the role of GIZ, Ger-
many’s agency for development and international co-
operation, was considered crucial: “GIZ is a battle 
force”30. This is linked to the unique position of GIZ’s 
                                                          
27 Moroccan and German interview partners, MEMEE and 
GIZ, 11/03/2014 and 27/02/2014, Rabat. 
28 German interview partner, 12/02/2014, Rabat. 
29 International interview partner, France, 04/03/2014, Rabat 
30 International interview partner, France, 04/03/2014, Rabat. 
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advisors, some of whom are operating from offices 
within the Moroccan Ministry for Energy, with direct 
communication channels to decision-makers. 
5.2. Perceived Desirability of Drawing Lessons from the 
German Energiewende  
A central point for the discussion of transfer between 
Germany and Morocco is an assessment of Moroccan 
officials’ views on the Energiewende and of the trans-
ferability of experiences from Germany to the Moroc-
can context. Interviewees on the Moroccan side were 
univocal when it came to considering the German en-
ergy transition experience as an outstanding model 
and an inspiration: “I, personally know that there is 
nothing and no one better than Germany, also when 
you look at technology”31, “Germany is the (…) world 
leader in renewable energy, so it’s a very good thing to 
observe what they do and to have them tell us what 
works and what does not work”32 or “Morocco is defi-
nitely following Germany on its way”33 are just some 
out of a large number of, often unsolicited, statements 
on German leadership in renewable energy.  
Some Moroccan interview partners however under-
lined differences with regard to the driving forces be-
hind their country’s energy transition. The German En-
ergiewende was referred to as a “choice”, as a 
“determined, ambitious, courageous”34 policy or even 
as a “luxury decision”, since “in Europe you can exit 
nuclear power just like that and replace it by anything 
you want”35. The Moroccan energy transition, in con-
trast, was seen as a response to an urgency, namely ris-
ing fossil fuel prices, especially in 2007/200836. Some 
Moroccan interview partners also put the decision in 
the context of a global trend: “It’s a necessity. We don’t 
have a choice. Like all other countries in the world we 
want to appropriate new, clean technologies”37.  
5.3. The Role of Transfer in the Development of the 
Moroccan Energy Strategy and Solar Plan 
Interview partners who were involved in the design of 
the 2008 Moroccan energy strategy and the 2009 Mo-
roccan solar plan agreed that a study (Roller et al., 
2007) prepared by German research institutes, fi-
nanced by German development cooperation and initi-
ated by Moroccan and German actors38 had a “very, 
very important influence”39. King Mohammed VI and 
                                                          
31 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
32 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 06/03/2014, Rabat. 
33 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 24/02, 2014, Rabat.  
34 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 24/02/2014, Rabat. 
35 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 10/03/2014. 
36 Moroccan interview partner, MEMEE, 11/03/2014, Rabat. 
37 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
38 Moroccan interview partner, MEMEE, 11/03/2014, Rabat. 
39 Moroccan interview partner, MEMEE , 12/03, Rabat. 
the Moroccan government had come under considera-
ble pressure to develop a new energy strategy due to 
sharply rising fossil fuel prices in 2007 and 2008.  The 
German-sponsored study (Roller et al., 2007) outlined 
four possible future energy scenarios, shedding a par-
ticularly positive light on a scenario entitled “balanced 
portfolio”, with a high amount of CSP and wind. Neces-
sary adaptations to the legal and institutional frame-
work were described in detail and Morocco’s tremen-
dous renewable energy potential underlined.  
By demonstrating an attractive cost-benefit ratio of 
renewable energy for Morocco, by providing estimates 
of expected job creation, and by referring to CSP as a 
potential area for industrial development, the study 
provided arguments to proponents of renewable ener-
gy, strengthening their bargaining position. The study 
was presented to the Minister for Energy by the Ger-
man consultants and representatives of ADEREE made 
sure it was subsequently transmitted to the royal cabi-
net, where it was “read with great interest”, “outplay-
ing another study”40 carried out at that time by a major 
international consultancy firm, which recommended to 
focus on coal. The decision to introduce ambitious re-
newable energy targets to the Moroccan energy strat-
egy and the subsequent choice of CSP for lighthouse 
projects in the Moroccan solar plan is of course not 
solely due to the effect of evidence provided by Ger-
man experts. However, interview partners directly in-
volved in the process, agreed on the decisive role of 
the detailed scenarios the study provided, reinforcing 
the position of pro-renewables voices within the Mo-
roccan energy landscape (ADEREE, MEMEE) and facili-
tating decision-making in favor of ambitious renewa-
bles targets. Apart from cognitive resources, the 
availability of preferential funding for renewable ener-
gy projects from the German KfW, the World Bank and 
other financial institutions might also have played a 
role in shifting the focus to renewables. However, in-
terview partners did not see the availability of funding 
for these projects as the decisive driving factor for the 
general decision to introduce renewables.  
As far as technology choice is concerned, transfer of 
knowledge and evidence through German-Moroccan 
channels, together with financial incentives through 
preferential loans made available by KfW, the World 
Bank’s Clean Technology Fund and others, undoubtedly 
facilitated the decision to focus on CSP in the first 
phase of the Moroccan Solar Plan. On a micro-level, 
Germany funded the attendance of a high-ranking offi-
cial from MEMEE to a CSP conference in Germany only 
weeks before the surprising announcement of the Mo-
roccan Solar Plan and of its focus on CSP. The official’s 
enthusiastic report back at MEMEE on the opportuni-
ties of CSP he had been able to discover at the confer-
ence provided another impulse in favor of the Moroc-
                                                          
40 Moroccan interview partner, MEMEE, 11/03/2014, Rabat. 
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can Solar Plan and of choosing CSP for its first stages of 
implementation. Germany’s role in technology choice 
was recognized and seen critically by a number of in-
terview partners, in particular by officials from third 
countries: “The German policy was to say that they had 
already done photovoltaics in Germany, so they would 
now invest in CSP. CSP, you can’t do it in Germany, so 
let’s do it in Morocco. That is the reason Morocco went 
for the most expensive technology (…)41”. The cost of 
electricity generated at CSP plants was seen as particu-
larly problematic in the absence of concrete prospects 
of exporting electricity to Europe. Several interview 
partners therefore expressed their expectation for Ger-
many to continue its support to electricity export pro-
jects despite resistance from other EU member states. 
5.4. Keeping Decentralization on the Political Agenda 
Well before the announcement of Morocco’s energy 
strategy, German advisors were closely involved in the 
development of a draft law for renewable energy that 
was adopted in the Council of Government, leading 
media to announce that Morocco “imported the [Ger-
man] Renewable Energy Act” (Klimaretter, 2007). Alt-
hough the law was not adopted by parliament due to 
upcoming elections, it successfully brought the issue of 
decentralized, small-scale renewable electricity genera-
tion to the agenda. Building up on this foundation, rep-
resentatives of GIZ—together with (private sector) ac-
tors from Morocco—subsequently supported an 
opening of the low-voltage level to private producers 
of renewable electricity within the framework of the 
subsequent renewable energy law n°13-0942. Studies 
(Sidki, 2011; Jäger, 2011) were carried out on the initia-
tive of GIZ to show the potential of residential photo-
voltaics in Morocco with the deliberate aim of keeping 
discussions ongoing and supporting those in favour of 
decentralization among Moroccan decision-makers. A 
high-level official within the Moroccan Ministry for En-
ergy recalled GIZ “demonstrated many times that we 
could develop 2000MW (…) through residential [PV] 
only. The Germans said and repeated that, I can con-
firm”43, leading to the topic regaining momentum in 
the political debate in 2013 and 2014. A Moroccan 
consultant involved in working groups with GIZ and 
MEMEE representatives described GIZ’s role as “in-
forming the debate and bringing all relevant stake-
holders to the table”, “getting the Ministry to think” 
and “showing (…) that everyone could win from an 
opening of the low voltage level”. Germany’s involve-
ment, according to the consultant, was crucial in “get-
ting things moving again”, “from a categorical ‘no’ to 
                                                          
41 International interview partner, Spain, 27/02/2014, Rabat. 
42German interview partner, GIZ, and Moroccan interview 
partner, consultant, 25/02/2014 and 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
43 Moroccan interview partner, MEMEE, 13/03/2014, Rabat. 
the possibility to discuss the issue”44. 
According to a range of observers, an informal alli-
ance of GIZ officials convinced of the importance of 
small-scale renewables based on the German Ener-
giewende experience and of Moroccan private sector 
representatives managed to keep the issue of decen-
tralised generation on the agenda. Regular workshops 
and meetings with MEMEE officials led the topic to be 
picked up again by the government and, in 2014, a 
roadmap for photovoltaics including the low voltage 
level was eventually presented. Policy transfer in this 
instance thus affected the stage of agenda-setting in 
the decision-making process. 
5.5. Negative Lesson-Drawing Regarding Policy 
Instruments 
While the abovementioned influential German-
sponsored study (Roller et al., 2007) also recommend-
ed to consider feed-in tariffs as a policy instrument and 
German advisors had tried to promote this instrument 
in Morocco at the time of the first attempt for a re-
newable energy law, the ministerial reaction to this 
idea was negative (Jäger, 2011). Moroccan interview 
partners considered feed-in tariffs inappropriate for 
the Moroccan context, in particular because of what 
they perceived as negative lessons from Germany and 
other European countries: “the example of feed-in tar-
iffs that would rather be a negative lesson. They had a 
massive exit of cash flow”45. Although negative lesson-
drawing from the German experience was an im-
portant reason for officials’ refusal of feed-in tariffs, it 
was not the only one. 
Even more important was the view that feed-in tar-
iffs did not fit the policy objectives Morocco pursued. 
Most Moroccan interviewees who expressed their 
opinion on this issue did not see any potential benefit 
of following Germany’s example of feed-in tariffs, 
which were expected to increase electricity prices 
without providing benefits in terms of industrial policy, 
contrary to their effect in Germany: “In final, feed-in 
tariffs benefit the industry. As we don’t have any re-
newable energy technology industry in Morocco (…) 
they are not interesting for us at all. Although their ef-
fect in terms of massive RES deployment, GDP, job cre-
ation, added valued and wealth creation [in Germany] 
is really important”46. This position was not only com-
mon among interview partners from MEMEE and ONE, 
but also shared by academics: “In Germany, the feed-in 
tariff incentivized people (…). Here, it is not possible. 
We cannot do a feed-in tariff, this policy cannot work 
in Morocco. There is no alternative to first developing 
large-scale projects to render the technology profitable 
                                                          
44 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
45 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 06/03/2014, Rabat. 
46 Moroccan interview partner, ADEREE, 24/02, 2014, Rabat.  
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and when it is profitable, the population can get in-
volved. But you cannot do it exactly like Germany”47. 
Some German officials went as far as to draw paral-
lels between the refusal of feed-in tariffs and general 
skepticism towards decentralized electricity generation 
due to French colonial heritage (“this focus on large 
projects is a sort of French heritage in Moroccans’ 
hearts and minds—that’s a pity, but not very surpris-
ing”48). A second central reason for resistance against 
feed-in tariffs mentioned was their potential impact on 
local electricity distribution companies (“régies”), who 
would see their revenues decrease if self-generation 
increases. A third explanation given by a small number 
of interview partners for the refusal of feed-in tariffs in 
Morocco was that World Bank officials had allegedly 
expressed a strong preference for an auction system 
for renewables instead of feed-in tariffs in Morocco. 
Given the high amounts of funding made available by 
the World Bank for renewable energy projects, this 
preference could have had an additional influence on 
policy makers’ decisions. Most importantly however, this 
element of the German energy transition approach was 
considered inappropriate given the regulatory culture, 
economic and social framework conditions and policy 
objectives pursued through renewables in Morocco. 
5.6. Summary of Transfer Outcomes 
Although, in a complex decision-making process, the 
exact “share” of any source of inspiration cannot be 
quantified, findings from interviews leave little doubt 
about the importance of interaction with German offi-
cials for advocates of renewable energy in Morocco. 
Germany has a unique position in the field of renewa-
ble energy in Morocco as compared to other bilateral 
partners and even multilateral institutions. For those 
interviewed, the German energy transition was the 
main point of reference in the field of renewable ener-
gy policy, from which lessons (positive and negative 
ones) could be drawn.  
This section’s aim was to provide examples on the 
transfer of know-how, evidence and experience from 
German transfer agents and/or the German Ener-
giewende to Morocco, with a focus on the outcome of 
these transfer processes. In summary, German efforts 
to promote renewables were effective in empowering 
pro-renewables advocates and in providing crucial evi-
dence facilitating the reliance on renewables in the 
Moroccan energy strategy. Evidence provided very like-
ly also contributed to the decision to start the imple-
mentation of the Moroccan solar plan with a large-
scale CSP project, along other factors such as available 
funding. Ongoing advocacy for decentralized electricity 
generation by German advisors, through workshops, 
                                                          
47 Moroccan interview partner, academia, 25/02/2014, Rabat. 
48 German interview partner, GIZ, 12/02/2014, Rabat. 
studies and working groups, contributed to bringing 
the issue of small photovoltaics to the agenda and 
keeping it there until the recent announcement of a 
roadmap for photovoltaics including small-scale gener-
ation. Despite earlier attempts to promote German-
style feed-in tariffs in Morocco, negative lessons drawn 
from the German Energiewende experience concerning 
this instrument contributed to the selection of an al-
ternative policy instrument.  
Despite priorities being perceived as different, the 
(selective) transfer of principles and ideas provided by 
German advisors or from the German Energiewende, 
was possible in Morocco. This finding is discussed in 
the next section.  
6. Discussion: Explaining Lesson-Drawing when 
Objectives Differ 
Indications of effective policy transfer and lesson-
drawing between Germany and Morocco only partly 
confirm expectations from the policy transfer literature 
on the need for policy objectives to be similar for a 
sender’s model to be taken into consideration (see Sec-
tion 2.2). To explain when policy transfer is possible 
despite differing approaches to energy transition gov-
ernance, the following elements can be considered. 
If similarity is seen as a determinant for transfer, 
Germany is not a “most likely” source of lessons for a 
Moroccan energy transition. Moroccans interviewed 
did nevertheless see few alternatives to considering 
the German model of energy policy, because it was 
perceived as “leading”. Morocco aims for—at least—
regional leadership in the field of renewable energy, 
possibly stretching out to the whole of Western Africa 
(“Morocco can become a reference”49). One interview 
partner summarized the Moroccan aim of belonging to 
the same group of leaders as Germany as follows: 
“What you hear right now in Morocco is they ‘want to 
do it just like Germany’ and there is no reason not to 
do as well as the Germans do, especially because Mo-
rocco has sunshine in addition! They observe very 
closely what is happening in Germany and want to do 
that too”50. Thus, the aim of belonging to a common 
“reference group” (Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 43) of 
leaders in renewable energy, might explain Morocco’s 
willingness to “follow Germany on its way”51. The per-
ceived success and reputation of the German model 
did, in the case of Morocco, allow for consideration of 
the German Energiewende as a legitimate source of 
lessons despite clear differences with regard to objec-
tives pursued. This was decisively facilitated by struc-
                                                          
49 Moroccan interview partner, consultant, 10/03/2014, Rabat. 
50 International interview partner, private sector, 21/02/2014, 
Casablanca. 
51 International interview partner, private sector, 21/02/2014, 
Casablanca. 
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tures of bilateral cooperation (presence of German advi-
sors, capacity-building measures, study tours, workshops 
etc.) in place since the 1980s. These channels not only 
allow for learning but also increase the “availability” of 
the German model—a central condition for policy 
transfer (Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 44). 
It can be underlined at this point that “moral sup-
port”, “a vision, a philosophy”, “knowledge about long-
term scenarios”, “Energiewende soft skills”52 and 
“knowledge about technologies and system manage-
ment” were very frequently cited as items Moroccans 
hoped to transfer from Germany to support their own 
energy transition, regardless of differences in what is 
to be achieved through the deployment of renewables.  
From a theoretical point of view, the case of re-
newable energy policy transfer between Germany and 
Morocco shows that the reality of policy transfer needs 
to be assessed along different policy dimensions (Kling-
ler-Vidra, 2014, p. 58). Analysis presented in this article 
shows that the study of policy transfer cannot be lim-
ited to assessing whether a specific policy was adopted 
elsewhere, but needs to take into account that even if 
differing policy objectives and regulatory traditions 
prevent instruments from traveling across borders,  
transfer is possible and can impact fundamental policy 
orientations. 
7. Conclusion 
Literature on policy transfer, instrument selection and 
leadership points to the importance of similar policy 
objectives for transfer to happen. Findings presented in 
this article do however call for a more nuanced ap-
proach to the assessment of policy transfer.  
From the analysis of ranking exercises and semi-
structured interviews presented in this article, energy 
independence and socio-economic objectives emerge 
as the central drivers for Morocco’s renewable energy 
strategy in the eyes of those interviewed. With decen-
tralization, climate protection and avoiding nuclear 
power not being considered (important) objectives in 
Morocco, significant differences compared to policy 
objectives and realities of the German Energiewende 
are visible.  
Despite these differences, a shared aim for leader-
ship, a longstanding history of cooperation in the ener-
gy sector and Germany’s strong reputation as a leader 
in renewable energy created opportunities for policy 
transfer. While negative lessons from the German ex-
perience reinforced opposition to feed-in tariffs in Mo-
rocco, the provision of evidence by German transfer 
agents likely facilitated the decision for high shares of 
renewables as part of the Moroccan energy strategy.  
These findings show that studies of policy transfer 
need to go beyond the assessment of whether a specif-
                                                          
52 Moroccan interview partner, MASEN, 11/02/2014, Rabat. 
ic policy was adopted in another constituency. Insights 
presented in this article can also provide lessons for 
the effective design of strategies for “leadership by dif-
fusion” by pioneering countries. Leadership strategies 
based on basic common orientations, such as deploy-
ing more renewable energy, rather than on promoting 
specific instruments appear promising. In the case of 
Morocco, as several interview partners underlined, a 
future German outreach strategy could therefore con-
centrate on transferring “energy transition soft skills” 
such as knowledge about how transitions can be man-
aged, communicated, planned and sustained in the 
long-run. 
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Annex 
Table A1. Overview of ranking outcomes. 
Nat N° Liber Clim Jobs Decen Price Indep Nucl Indu Lead Export  Invest Societ Intl 
D I1 0 3 1 3 1 1 4 1 0 2 2 3 0 
D I2 2 4 3 6 1 1 5 4 0 5 3 4 5 
D I3 7 6 2 0 1 1 7 2 0 3 3 6 3 
D I4 3 4 2 5 1 1 5 2 4 2 3 5 4 
D I5 6 0 4 0 1 1 9 9 4 4 4 0 4 
D I6 2 4 3 6 1 1 5 4 0 5 3 4 5 
D I7 13 13 2 13 13 1 13 2 2 2 2 13 13 
D I8 0 5 1 0 3 2 0 1 4 6 0 0 5 
D I9 13 1 2 11 8 6 12 4 3 9 7 5 10 
D I10 8 5 2 6 8 1 6 3 6 4 5 7 4 
I I11 2 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 2 2 1 3 2 
I I12 7 7 4 8 3 2 8 6 4 6 1 5 5 
I I13 0 5 3 0 5 1 0 4 6 2 4 6 0 
I I14 0 0 3 0 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
I I15 7 2 6 3 0 1 0 6 5 2 4 0 0 
I I16 0 4 2 0 8 1 0 2 0 8 2 0 0 
I I17 8 11 10 11 6 4 12 10 9 12 8 10 11 
M I18 0 5 4 0 0 1 0 2 6 3 0 0 0 
M I19 9 8 3 11 6 5 10 4 2 7 13 1 12 
M I20 1 3 9 9 7 1 9 9 4 2 5 7 6 
M I21 6 2 1 0 4 0 0 5 0 5 0 3 5 
M I22 6 1 1 5 0 2 0 3 1 0 4 1 0 
M I23 5 4 4 5 4 2 4 3 1 3 3 4 3 
M I24 11 8 3 6 2 1 0 5 9 12 4 10 7 
M I25 11 4 3 7 13 2 1 9 6 12 10 5 8 
M I26 12 6 2 10 7 1 13 6 6 13 2 12 12 
M I27 3 4 4 2 1 2 0 5 4 3 6 1 0 
M I28 3 1 2 3 2 1 4 2 3 2 1 4 2 
M I29 12 8 5 7 2 1 13 6 9 10 4 3 11 
M I30 1 7 3 4 3 2 8 3 6 5 3 7 4 
M I31 9 6 3 10 1 2 11 5 12 8 4 7 13 
M I32 8 7 3 0 2 2 0 4 10 6 5 1 9 
M I33 7 6 4 0 0 1 0 3 5 8 0 0 0 
M I34 12 6 2 13 1 3 10 7 5 11 4 8 9 
M I35 3 1 2 3 2 1 4 2 3 2 1 4 2 
M I36 0 3 2 0 4 1 0 2 6 7 5 0 0 
M I37 8 3 5 13 2 1 12 4 10 6 7 9 11 
M I38 3 5 4 10 1 2 0 6 8 9 7 0 0 
M I39 4 0 3 9 8 7 0 2 6 1 5 0 0 
M I40 9 8 2 0 0 6 0 1 3 7 4 5 0 
Notes: D = German organizations, I = International, M = Moroccan, Liber = Liberalization, Climate = Climate protection, Jobs = Job 
creation, Decen = Decentralization, Price = Affordable electricity prices, Indep = energy independence, Nucl = avoiding nuclear ener-
gy, Indu = creating an industry, Lead = leadership, Export = electricity exports, Invest = attracting investors, Socie = societal projects, 
Intl = expectation of international community 
